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Abstract 
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is a comprehensive preferential 
trade agreement that is expected to have a significant effect in EU and US bilateral trade and 
investment relations. As the negotiations are ongoing, this paper uses a scenario analysis to 
estimate the potential effects of TTIP under likely negotiated outcomes. In our main scenario, 
we assume a final trade deal where current tariffs are eliminated and non-tariff barriers are 
significantly reduced. Using a CGE model (WorldScan), we simulate the potential economic 
effects for the Netherlands and the EU. We find that US-Dutch bilateral trade doubles and this 
is translated into a positive but moderate effect on income of 1.7% for the Netherlands by the 
year 2030. These potential gains are higher than those for the EU and the US (both around 1%). 
Keywords: TTIP, preferential trade agreements, CGE models 
JEL Classification: F13, F17, C68 
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 TTIP and its potential economic outcomes 3
2.1 What is TTIP? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2 Regulatory cooperation and NTBs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3 What are the potential economic effects from TTIP? . . . . . . . . . 6
3 Review of economic studies on TTIP 7
4 Using WorldScan to assess TTIP 8
4.1 What is WorldScan? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2 Trade cost reductions associated with TTIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3 TTIP simulations using WorldScan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5 Additional economic effects from TTIP 15
6 Conclusions 17
A Appendix 19
A.1 Technical specifications of the WorldScan CGE model . . . . . . . . 19
A.2 TTIP simulations with different NTB reductions . . . . . . . . . . . 24
i
Potential economic effects of TTIP for the
Netherlands and the EU
Hugo Rojas-Romagosa
CEPS Working Document No. 425 / September 2016
1 Introduction
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is currently being ne-
gotiated between the European Union (EU) and the United States (US). This deep
integration agreement consists of three main pillars: eliminating tariffs, regulatory
cooperation to reduce non-tariff barriers (NTBs)1, and other behind the border
rules. Of these, the first two components will have direct economic impacts, and it
is expected that the NTB reductions related to TTIP will yield the largest economic
effects (Francois et al., 2013; Egger et al., 2015).
Since the EU and the US economies account for roughly half of world output
and world trade, the scope and international impact of TTIP is considerable. The
relatively large integration of both blocs has been the result of the post-war trade
liberalisation process, which also included a significant increase in transatlantic in-
vestments – both blocs are also each other’s most important investment partners.2
This trade liberalisation process, however, has been mostly driven by the reduction
of tariff rates. With relatively low tariffs levels at present, the economic focus of
TTIP has shifted to the reduction of the biggest remaining hurdles in transatlantic
trade: non-tariff barriers (NTBs). Thus, a comprehensive agreement that includes
NTBs is expected to provide the most economic impact.
Much of the general debate on TTIP, however, has focused on the desirability of
regulatory convergence and other political topics. Although these issues are central
to the negotiations on TTIP, and the political aftermath of the negotiations, in this
paper we focus our analysis exclusively on the economic perspective.3
The main objective of this paper, therefore, is to analyse the potential eco-
nomic effects of TTIP for the Netherlands. To achieve this goal we start by a short
1NTBs are also referred to as non-tariff measures (NTMs) and/or technical barriers to trade
(TBTs).
2When each individual EU country is analysed separately, however, intra-EU trade represents
the majority of EU countries’ trade flows. For the Netherlands, intra-EU trade represents around
70% of total trade and US trade is around 7%.
3See Ecorys (2016) for the potential environmental and social effects of TTIP.
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description of the main economic elements being negotiated under TTIP and their
potential economic effects. We then summarise the main studies that have estimated
the economic effects of TTIP. However, these previous TTIP studies have focused
on the overall gains for the EU and some of the larger EU countries.4 Therefore, in
this study we use WorldScan –the CPB in-house computational general equilibrium
(CGE) model– to assess the potential economic effects of TTIP for the Netherlands.
As part of the TTIP simulations, we have two main policy shocks: elimination of
tariffs between the US and all EU countries and reduction in NTB costs. For the
second shock, we follow the recent methodological approach in Egger et al. (2015)
to estimate the expected NTB reductions associated from TTIP. In our "full" TTIP
simulation we combine the previous two policy shocks to have both the tariff elimi-
nation and the NTB cost reductions.
We find macroeconomic effects for the US and for the aggregated EU region
that are similar to previous CGE studies (Francois et al., 2013; Egger et al., 2015).
For the Netherlands, we find that GDP and consumption per capita increase by
the year 2030 by more than the EU average, by 1.7% and 3.1% respectively. This
GDP increase is driven by a strong surge of bilateral trade between the US and the
EU, which is expected to double: EU exports to the US increase by 111%, while US
exports to the EU raise by 119%. Dutch exports to the US increase by 95%, but total
exports (to all destinations) increase by a more moderate 4%. TTIP also creates,
therefore, strong trade diversion patterns and Dutch exports to other EU countries
decreases by 2% and to third regions by roughly 3%. These trade diversion effects
also result in a relatively small decrease in trade and GDP for non-TTIP regions.
With respect to the labour market, our simulations show that with a full TTIP
scenario that eliminates tariffs and reduces NTBs, Dutch average wages will increase
by more than 2%. More importantly, the wages of both low- and high-skill workers
are expected to rise. This implies that TTIP will not significantly affect wage nor
income inequality. The sectoral reorganisation of production, however, implies that
workers in declining sectors will need to relocate to other sectors. This labour
displacement will have short term adjustment costs for those workers that need to
change employment. However, these additional costs are relatively small, since only
a small proportion of workers would have to change jobs and move from one sector
to another, in comparison to the job creation and destruction that occurs on a yearly
basis. In particular, we expect that about 1.5% of total jobs (around 114,000 jobs)
will be reallocated to other sectors in a 13 year period, while on a yearly basis,
13% of total jobs (around one million jobs) are either created or destroyed in the
Netherlands (Brull et al., 2010).5
4Studies that analysed the specific results for The Netherlands are Ecorys (2012, 2016). These
studies are based on the same CGE modelling as in Francois et al. (2013) and another methodology
to estimate NTB reductions associated with TTIP, which yields NTB information for a limited
number of sectors (cf. Berden and Francois, 2015).
5This is an indicator of job turnover, where both the newly created and the jobs that no longer
exist (destroyed) are summed together and compared to the total number of jobs.
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Finally, it is important to mention that these potential effects are likely to under-
estimate the full economic effects of TTIP, since our methodology does not analyse
additional economic effects of TTIP related to public procurement provisions, in-
creased FDI and dynamic effects from trade.
This paper proceeds as follows. We first explain in Section 2 the main character-
istics of TTIP and we list the potential economic effects. In Section 3 we summarise
the main results of the economic studies that have analysed TTIP. We then explain
in Section 4 the WorldScan CGE model, how the TTIP experiment is modelled and
what are the main economic results for the Netherlands. In Section 5 we discuss
some additional economic effects related to TTIP and we conclude in Section 6.
2 TTIP and its potential economic outcomes
2.1 What is TTIP?
The setup of TTIP is to become a deep and comprehensive preferential trade agree-
ment (PTA) between the European Union and the United States of America. As
such, TTIP is part of a broader trend of mega-regional arrangements and a number of
other "deep integration" PTAs that go beyond tariff reductions and are characterised
by behind-the-border measures and new rules for important trade-related issues.6
Recent "deep" PTAs include the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the freshly ne-
gotiated treaty between the EU-Canada (the Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement, CETA) and the recently launched trade negotiations between the EU
and Japan.7 By contrast, most "common" PTAs are focused on preferential market
access by decreasing tariffs and streamlining customs rules.
The main economic features of the TTIP negotiations are usually grouped into
three components (cf. Hamilton and Pelkmans, 2015). First, eliminating the re-
maining market access restrictions (i.e. tariffs and quotas). The current tariffs
between the EU and the USA are already relatively low –at around 3% in average8,
so eliminating these remaining tariffs is expected to only increase trade slightly.
Second, regulatory cooperation that is expected to reduce NTB costs. This effect
generates a direct trade cost reduction that has an unambiguous economic effect
through increased bilateral trade flows. There is empirical evidence that the trade
costs associated with NTBs are significantly more important than those associated
with tariffs (cf. Ecorys, 2009). This component has received the most attention in
6These measures apply to a broad set of topics, such as increased cooperation and harmonisa-
tion of regulations, open services markets, technical and regulatory barriers to trade, investment
and competition, access to public contracts and (i.e public procurement), and investor protection
legislation, among others.
7There are also differences in scope between these deep trade agreements. Some are more
comprehensive or "broad" –including a larger number of topics, while others go "deeper" in the
degree of integration. For example, TPP is a broad agreement, while CETA is both broad and has
deeper integration provisions.
8Although still important for some specific sectors, such as agriculture, textiles and apparel,
footwear and processed foods.
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the economic literature so far and we analyse the different aspects of regulatory
cooperation in the following sections.
Finally, the third component groups other behind the border rules.9 These other
rules are primarily concerned with legal issues that do not have a direct economy-
wide economic impact and as such, are not included in our main economic studies
on TTIP.10
2.2 Regulatory cooperation and NTBs
2.2.1 What is regulatory cooperation?
In the current Transatlantic setting, different historical and institutional approaches
to similar regulatory challenges have generated two distinct regulatory environments
in the US and the EU. This development has had the unintended consequence of in-
creasing costs for export firms, which have to comply with each region’s regulations.
These increased costs are what we refer to –in a generic way– as non-tariff barriers
(NTBs).
The TTIP negotiations have pursued consultative mechanisms among regulatory
agencies to achieve regulatory convergence and cooperation. This process should
partially eliminate redundant regulations, identify more efficient procedures, and
improve regulatory transparency (Chase and Pelkmans, 2015). The most important
point, however, is that this regulatory cooperation procedure will be done while
keeping intact the high levels of safety, health, environment, investor/saver, labour,
and consumer protection already in existence in both the EU and US (Hamilton
and Pelkmans, 2015). In general, protection levels are policy objectives that re-
flect fundamental societal preferences that are upheld by constitutional and legal
constraints. For instance, the upholding of these protection levels is an explicit
condition required by the European Parliament (July 8th 2015) for the future ap-
proval of TTIP. Thus, regulatory cooperation under TTIP will not change labour
standards, environmental legislation, consumer protection rules, human health and
safety, food safety standards, and other protection levels (see also SER, 2016).
To sum up, the aim of TTIP negotiations is to keep the existing EU- and US-
specific protection levels intact, while the regulations and procedures that are used
to ensure and evaluate these protection levels (i.e. the means to achieve current
protection levels) are harmonised and/or mutually recognised. Given that there will
not be any protection level convergence, then the scope of regulatory cooperation
will be effectively bounded. This means that it will not be feasible to achieve a
broad nor complete regulation harmonisation, and some of the existing regulatory
9Which include: competition rules, intellectual property rights (IPRs), investment protection,
investor-state dispute settlements (ISDS) and Government-to-Government dispute settlements,
among others.
10Negotiating priorities are: public procurement, rules of origin, rules for administered protection
(e.g. anti-dumping and countervailing duties), intellectual property (including geographical indica-
tions), and financial regulations. For instance, see Poulsen et al. (2015) and Baetens (2015) for an
in-depth analysis on ISDS issues.
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divergences will remain. In the economic analysis below, this fact is reflected on
the common assumption that only a fraction –usually 50% or less– of the non-tariff
barriers costs currently associated with regulatory divergences could be removed as
part of the TTIP agreement.11
2.2.2 NTBs and trade effects of regulatory cooperation
The process of regulatory cooperation within TTIP is expected to reduce NTB
costs. In other words, the improved transparency and cooperation on regulations
is expected to reduce cross-border trade barriers and additional costs between both
blocs. In practice, however, there are a vast number of such regulations and pro-
cedures. In general, regulatory cooperation encompasses a very extensive range
of different types of technical regulations, sector- and product-specific regulations,
and the cooperation of several regulatory agencies.12 For instance, harmonisation
and/or recognition of technical requirements and procedures on product testing,
inspection and certification, and labelling regulations, among others. Egan and
Pelkmans (2015) explain why these regulations are central to TTIP negotiations
and why they are also difficult to address directly. They also argue that regulatory
equivalence (cross-recognition of procedures) is a more viable option in many cases
than regulatory convergence (harmonisation).
Even though this process of regulatory cooperation is expected to be significant
under TTIP, the actual possibilities to reduce costs associated with regulation is
limited by legal and political constraints (Chase and Pelkmans, 2015). Unlike tariffs,
many regulations (and their associated NTB costs) cannot simply be removed, as
they often serve important and legitimate domestic objectives like product safety
and environmental protection. Differences in the social and political approach to risk
and consumer protection make even the obvious regulation a complex issue.13 As
explained in Egger et al. (2015) NTBs are adopted for a wide variety of reasons –only
some of which have anything to do with their effects on trade– and removing NTBs
can simply not be possible because of existing legal and institutional structures. For
example, reducing NTBs may require constitutional changes, unrealistic legislative
changes, or unrealistic technical changes.14
Given the broad range of regulations it is an enormous task to directly evaluate
the economic impact of individual regulations and procedures.15 Moreover, it is
11See Section 4.3 for further details.
12See Egan and Pelkmans (2015) for an in-depth analysis of domestic regulation in both the
US and the EU, current international regulatory cooperation topics, and the possible channels of
regulatory cooperation within TTIP.
13For specific examples see the firm survey responses to regulation in the Ecorys (2009) annex
material, "Annex VI Business survey results". This annex provides examples on an industry basis
of sources of cost differences when the same firms operate in multiple regulatory regimes.
14See Egger et al. (2015) for more on the relation between NTB cost reduction and political
economy issues. They also analyse three specific cases of relevance to TTIP: regulation of cultural
goods, food safety regulation, and financial regulation.
15In addition, there are still no concrete negotiated issues to this date that can be thoroughly
analysed. As explained above, negotiations are still on-going without an official end date.
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technically difficult to obtain accurate estimations of current country- and sector-
specific NTB cost levels.16 Most economic studies, therefore, have devised indirect
methods to estimate how regulatory cooperation can translate into specific NTB
cost decreases. Berden and Francois (2015), in particular, review the most recent
methods that have been employed to quantify NTBs within TTIP.
Even under the limitations expressed above and the mandate on TTIP negotia-
tions –to yield regulatory convergence without lowering protection levels– the process
of regulatory cooperation can still yield significant economic benefits. In many cases
the potential costs associated with NTBs may still be mitigated or reduced through
partial regulatory convergence and mutual recognition. While this is likely to be
a difficult process, the potential benefits in terms of productivity and incomes are
substantial (Berden and Francois, 2015). For example, the safety and consumer
protection levels of the automobile industry in both regions are very similar, but di-
vergent regulations require that European car manufacturers crash over a hundred
custom-made models –in addition to those already crashed to meet the European
regulations– to meet the different safety, testing, and certification requirements in
the US. This procedure costs large firms hundreds of millions of euros, and makes
it near impossible for smaller European firms to sell in the US market (Chase and
Pelkmans, 2015). If regulatory cooperation under TTIP can partially reduce some
of these costs –while keeping the safety and consumer protection levels intact– this
will translate into lower NTB costs that would allow a larger variety of automobiles
sold in both regions, besides improving competition and final consumer prices.
Most TTIP studies, therefore, assume that a partial reduction of NTB costs,
which maintains the current levels of protection can be achieved. Moreover, these
NTB cost reductions will still be significant enough to generate important economic
gains from TTIP.
2.3 What are the potential economic effects from TTIP?
Traditional PTAs and trade policy experiments are mainly concerned with tariff
reductions. In this context, the changes in relative prices associated with sector-
specific changes in tariffs will translate into changes in bilateral trade flows: it is
expected that lower sectoral tariffs will increase sectoral trade. In turn, these changes
in relative prices and bilateral sectoral trade flows will create general equilibrium
effects: broader macroeconomic shifts in production, consumption, employment, and
welfare. It is also expected that the changes in bilateral trade flows will affect third
countries as well, as long as these initial effects are relatively large.
As mentioned above, the current average tariff level between the USA and EU is
already relatively low, so no substantial economic effects are expected from eliminat-
ing bilateral tariffs. The main economic effects of deep preferential trade agreements,
such as TTIP, are driven by the potential impact of reduced NTB cost levels (Berden
16By their nature, NTBs are seldom directly observable –in contrast to tariffs, and as such must
be estimated as ad-valorem equivalents (AVEs) that can be used in economic policy simulations
and analysis.
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and Francois, 2015; Egger et al., 2015). It is expected that NTB cost reductions, if
significant, can also be translated into significant economic effects. Moreover, these
NTB cost reductions will not only affect those sectors where the barriers are re-
duced, but as with tariff reductions they will also have a direct effect on trade and
an indirect general equilibrium effect.
In general, both regions are already highly integrated, so no broad economy-
wide changes are expected. The combination of tariff elimination and NTB cost
reductions, however, can create positive but limited welfare gains. Although these
economy-wide changes are expected to be relatively small, there are some significant
shocks in particular sectors, affecting production and consumption in these sectors
and requiring workers to shift to those sectors that will expand.
3 Review of economic studies on TTIP
There have been several studies that have analysed the economic effects of TTIP.17
The best known analysis is the CEPR study by Francois et al. (2013). This is the
reference study by the European Commission and DG Trade (European Commission,
2013) and the study used by most commentators.18 This is a CGE-based analysis
that uses previously estimated NTB levels (Ecorys, 2009) to construct a series of
TTIP scenarios that combine tariff elimination, NTB reductions and spillover effects
to third countries. This study, as well as other CGE-based analyses, find positive
but limited real income and welfare effects.
Even though CGE models are considered to be the state of the art approach
in assessing TTIP (Pelkmans et al., 2014; Mustilli, 2015), a set of papers based on
new quantitative trade models have also been used to estimate the economic effects
of TTIP. Even though these new methodological approach enhances the available
tools to analyse trade policy, this new crop of structural gravity (SG) models have
not yet created an established "standard" in the methodology. As such, the intrinsic
characteristics of these models can change drastically from study to study and this
is reflected in a wide array of predicted economic impacts from TTIP. Nevertheless,
two main issues can explain the main different outcomes between CGE and SG
models: the estimation and assumed level of NTB cost reductions, and particular
modelling features.19
We find that the hybrid study by Egger et al. (2015) provides the most up-to-
date, detailed and reliable results on the potential effects of TTIP. It provides a
reliable combination of NTB level estimations using gravity equations and incorpo-
rates them into a standard CGE model. As with other studies, it finds a substantial
17In a companion document (Bekkers and Rojas-Romagosa, 2016), we present an in-depth analysis
of the various studies that have evaluated the economic impact of TTIP. In this section we present
a summary of this survey.
18 See for example, The Economist (2013), Rodrik (2015), Wolf (2015), and The Guardian (2015).
The importance of this study is highlighted by the request of the European Parliament to conduct
an independent evaluation, which was done by Pelkmans et al. (2014).
19See Section 6 in Bekkers and Rojas-Romagosa (2016) for a detailed analysis.
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increase in bilateral trade flows between the US and the EU of 80%. In general,
total trade for both regions is expected to increase at around 5%. These increased
bilateral and total trade flows generate positive real income gains of around 1 to 2%
for the EU and the US, while third-countries remain broadly unaffected, with the
exception of some particular countries that currently trade more intensively with
the TTIP countries. The changes in trade flows, in addition, are associated with
moderate inter-sectoral changes in production and employment. Labour displace-
ment caused by TTIP will, however, be well within the range of current year-on-year
labour market mobility.
4 Using WorldScan to assess TTIP
4.1 What is WorldScan?
WorldScan is a computational general equilibrium model for the world economy
(Lejour et al., 2006). The CGE modelling framework allows for economy-wide anal-
ysis and is the standard tool for trade policy analysis. Given that the WorldScan
model is similar to the standard GTAP-class CGE models,20 we are using the same
modelling techniques to assess TTIP as in the CEPR study (Francois et al., 2013),
the CEPII study (Fontagné et al., 2013), and the study by Egger et al. (2015).
The key features of a CGE framework include the model that describes economic
activity and behaviour, the underlying database that accounts for initial equilibrium
of the global economy (e.g. the GTAP database), as well as a set of parameters that
drive responses of agents to any given perturbation to the initial equilibrium. By
employing a balanced and internally consistent global database, in tandem with an
economic model that describes economic activity for a variety of sectors and agents in
the global economy, any change in exogenous variables can be assessed to understand
the effects on endogenous variables in the model. For example, preferential trade
agreements (PTAs) are usually assessed by imposing a trade policy shock (changing
bilateral tariffs and NTBs) to a baseline scenario. The resulting counterfactual
scenario is then compared with the baseline to obtain the potential economic effects
of the PTA.21
The particular WorldSan model employed in this paper uses the latest version
of the GTAP database (version 9 with base-year 2011) and distinguishes 21 goods
and services sectors (see Table 8 in the Appendix), and 33 countries and regions.
All EU countries are modelled separately, except for Belgium and Luxembourg, the
three Baltic States, and Croatia, Cyprus and Malta (see Table 9 in the Appendix).
20The main characteristics and references to the standard GTAP model can be found at:
www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/models/current.asp, while Hertel (2013) and Rutherford and Palt-
sev (2000) provide a detailed discussion of the GTAP-class models.
21A more detailed and technical explanation of the WorldScan CGE model is provided in Ap-
pendix A.1.
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4.2 Trade cost reductions associated with TTIP
In this section we calculate and estimate the different trade costs reductions that are
expected to occur once the TTIP agreement is applied. These trade cost reduction
values will then be used as the inputs into the CGE model to simulate the TTIP
experiment.
4.2.1 Tariffs
The most straightforward trade cost change within TTIP is the elimination of the
current remaining tariffs within the US and the EU. The tariff levels are taken
directly from the GTAP database.
As shown in Table 1, the current tariffs levels between the US and the EU are
relatively low at an average of around 3%. Some sectors, however, present above-
average levels: e.g. processed foods and motor vehicles.
Table 1: Applied tariffs in transatlantic trade in goods, 2011
Sector code US tariffs EU tariffs
Agriculture AGR 2.9% 3.8%
Primary energy and mining OMI 0.3% 0.1%
Energy ENG 1.4% 1.3%
Processed foods PFO 3.7% 12.3%
Low-tech manufacturing LTM 3.3% 2.2%
Metals and minerals MEM 2.0% 2.4%
Chemical, rubber and plastics CRP 1.4% 2.5%
Motor vehicles and parts MVH 1.0% 6.7%
Other transport equipment OTN 0.5% 1.4%
Electronic equipment ELE 0.3% 0.6%
Other machinery and equipment OME 1.0% 1.4%
Source: GTAP-9 database.
4.2.2 Estimating NTBs in goods
Translating the NTB reductions associated with the expected regulatory cooperation
within TTIP is a technically difficult task (see Section 2.2.2 above). In general,
obtaining accurate estimations of current country- and sector-specific NTB levels is
a complicated process. Berden and Francois (2015) review the most recent methods
that have been employed to quantify NTBs within TTIP.
In this study, we employ the NTB estimation methodology from Egger et al.
(2015), although using a different sectoral aggregation.22 They estimate NTB cost
reductions in manufacturing goods using as reference the impact of deep PTAs on
trade. This is done using a gravity model of bilateral trade, where bilateral trade
22We consider that this is the best available top-down approach, and as such, it is does not require
the time-consuming firm-level data from bottom-up methodologies.
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flows are a function of (exporter- and importer-) country-specific fixed effects, a set
of bilateral non-policy variables (e.g. geographical, cultural, historical), and two
policy variables: the log tariff margin and a PTA depth measure. The NTB effect
of trade agreements corresponds to the joint impact of PTAs conditional on tariffs
and the depth of PTAs. Hence, NTB effects of PTAs must be associated with and
can be estimated as effects beyond tariff reductions (Egger and Larch, 2011).
We follow Egger et al. (2015) and use the same econometric estimations and the
GTAP-9 database.23 This implies that we estimate existing NTB levels by 2011,
and partially reduce these NTBs with the TTIP simulations.24 Even though we use
the same estimation technique and data, our results are slightly different due to the
different sectoral aggregation we use.25
Once the parameters from gravity equation are estimated (i.e. the trade elastici-
ties with respect to the tariff margin and the FTA-depth variables) these coefficients
need to be translated into trade costs estimates as an ad-valorem equivalent (AVE).
These AVEs are necessary to shock the CGE model. We follow the same formula
used in Egger et al. (2015) to obtain the AVEs of NTBs. The estimated values are
shown in Table 2. From this table we observe that our overall (total manufacturing)
NTB estimations are close to those from Egger et al. (2015), although we have some-
what a lower value. This also applies to those sectors that are comparable between
both studies.
Table 2: Estimated transatlantic NTB costs in manufacturing, ad valorem equiva-
lents
Sector code Egger et al. 2015 own estimates
Agriculture AGR 15.8 15.4
Primary energy and mining OMI 16.1 16.1
Energy ENG n.a. 17.8
Processed foods PFO 33.8 32.0
Low-tech manufacturing LTM 3.6 5.4
Metals and minerals MEM 16.7 10.2
Chemical, rubber and plastics CRP 29.1 24.1
Motor vehicles and parts MVH 19.3 17.1
Other transport equipment OTN n.a. 12.4
Electronic equipment ELE 1.8 0.4
Other machinery and equipment OME 6.2 5.8
Total manufacturing 13.7 12.6
Notes: We have a different sectoral aggregation than in Egger et al. 2015. The sectors with values
for Egger et al. 2015 roughly correspond to our own sectoral definitions.
23For technical details on the precise two-stage econometric estimations see Section 3.2 in Egger
et al. (2015).
24In particular, the TTIP shock is simulated for 2017 and this also implies that the estimated
NTB levels for 2011 remain constant until that date.
25Also, there are some minor differences on how the GTAP data was processed.
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4.2.3 NTBs in services
To obtain AVE for NTBs in services, we also follow Egger et al. (2015) and use the
market access restrictions in services taken directly from the World Bank’s STRI
database (Jafari and Tarr, 2015). The corresponding AVE values are presented in
Table 3. Note that the estimated NTBs levels in services are different by region
–i.e. NTBs to enter the US market have different values than those for entering the
EU market. This is not the case in the estimated NTBs for manufacturing goods
in Table 2, where the econometric technique employed does not allow to distinguish
region-specific NTB levels.
Table 3: Estimated transatlantic NTB costs in services, ad valorem equivalents
Sector code EU NTBs US NTBs
Construction CNS 4.6 2.5
Air transport ATP 25.0 11.0
Water transport WTP 1.7 13.0
Other transport OTP 29.7 0.0
Communication CMN 1.1 3.5
Finance OFI 1.5 17.0
Insurance ISR 6.6 17.0
Other commercial services OCS 35.4 42.0
Recreational and other services ROS 4.4 2.5
Government and public services OSR n.a. n.a.
Sources: Egger et al. (2015) and Jafari and Tarr (2015).
4.3 TTIP simulations using WorldScan
In this section we present the results of our TTIP simulations using using our World-
Scan model. We construct three scenarios using the information on trade cost re-
ductions associated with TTIP:
1. Tariffs only (A): In our first scenario transatlantic tariffs are fully eliminated
2. NTBs only (B): In our second scenario NTBs for manufacturing and services
are partially reduced. As in Egger et al. (2015), we assume that 50% of the
estimated manufacturing and services NTB costs are cut, which reflects the
associated trade cost reductions of moving into a deep preferential trade agree-
ment.26
26This 50% share is taken from the study by Ecorys (2009), where half of the estimates NTB costs
are considered to be "actionable" or possible to reduce, while the other half of these NTB costs are
not possible to reduce due to legal, institutional and/or political constraints. See Section 2.1.2 in
Bekkers and Rojas-Romagosa (2016) for a detailed description. In addition, following Egger et al.
(2015) we also assume that NTBs for financial and insurance services will not be reduced under
TTIP.
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3. Full TTIP experiment (C): The third scenario combines the two previous sce-
narios to include both the tariff elimination and the NTB cost reductions.
It is important to note that contrary to the CEPR study (Francois et al., 2013)
and the study by Egger et al. (2015), we do not assume that the final regulation
cooperation agreements under TTIP will create positive spillovers for third countries.
In this context, if the new regulation framework agreed by TTIP becomes the new
regulation standard, then these studies assume that third countries will indirectly
benefit from a reduction in NTBs, since the new international regulation framework
could reduce the associated costs to trade with the EU and the US. However, it is
hard to envisage what the end-product of the negotiations on regulation cooperation
under TTIP will achieve, and if these sets of new regulations will become the new
international regulation norm.
The model is simulated between 2011 and 2030, with all the TTIP shocks sched-
uled for 2017. The results presented in Table 4 show the long-term effects of TTIP
as the difference between the simulated path of the economy and the baseline for
2030.
Table 4: TTIP simulation results, for each scenario, percentage changes with respect
to the baseline in 2030
A. Tariffs only B. NTBs only Full (A+B)
NLD EU28 USA NLD EU28 USA NLD EU28 USA
GDP 0.01 0.02 0.10 1.52 1.27 0.81 1.69 1.19 0.94
consumption per capita 0.01 0.01 0.09 2.79 2.15 1.74 3.11 2.16 1.93
export volume 0.21 0.35 1.45 3.43 5.41 18.28 3.94 6.24 21.45
import volume 0.25 0.35 1.15 6.57 7.88 20.88 7.50 8.99 23.85
real average wage 0.01 0.02 0.10 2.10 1.60 1.38 2.13 1.66 1.59
Notes: The scenario A simulates full elimination of bilateral tariffs. Scenario B simulates 50% cuts
in manufacturing and services NTBs, except on Finance and Insurance.
Source: Own WorldScan estimations using GTAP9 database.
From Table 4 we observe that the first scenario with tariff eliminations does
not generate much GDP nor consumption per capita gains, with values for the
Netherlands being close to zero. In the second scenario with NTB reductions, we
do observe significant gains in GDP and consumption, with values of around one
percentage point for the EU and the US. The economic gains for the Netherlands
are higher than the EU average with a GDP increase of 1.5% and a 2.8% increase in
consumption. Finally, the full TTIP scenario shows economic gains that are higher
than the NTB reduction scenario. In the full TTIP scenario the Netherlands has a
1.7% GDP increase, which is again higher than the EU average.27
27Note that the full TTIP scenario for the EU28 has lower GDP gains than in the NTBs only
scenario. This particular result can be explained by the EU28 being an aggregate of country-specific
results, with sector-specific trade cost changes, some of which can offset each other and lower the
overall results when both tariffs and NTBs are reduced.
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The results for the EU and the US are in line with other CGE studies on TTIP,
where most of the gains from TTIP are mainly derived from the reduction of NTBs,
while the GDP increases are positive and significant for both economic blocs and
within the range of one to two percentage point gains.28 In addition, we run alterna-
tive simulations with different NTB reductions than in the main full TTIP scenario.
We find that there is a roughly linear relation between NTB cuts and GDP increases:
half the reduction in NTBs, with respect to the full TTIP scenario, is associated
with around half the GDP changes.29
These GDP gains are directly related to increased trade, reflected in the rise in
trade volumes (exports and imports). We also find that the average (i.e. for both
high- and low-skill workers) real wages increase significantly in the Netherlands
(2.1%). In addition, the wage increase is more pronounced for high-skill workers
(2.4%) than for low-skill workers (1.8%), which will generate relatively small rise in
wage inequality.
Trade volumes increase mainly due to the significant expansion of bilateral trade
between the EU and the US. This is shown in Table 5 where the value of EU exports
to the US increase by 111% and from the US to the EU by 119%. The Netherlands
experiences an export increase with the US of 95%. These significant trade increases
between the EU and the US are reflected in higher total exports for both regions,
while there is a decrease of trade with third regions.30 In other words, TTIP will
generate trade diversion effects. The Netherlands, for instance, increases its total
exports by around 4% but given the strong increase of exports to the US, this comes
at the cost of lower exports to other EU countries and to the rest of the World
(RoW), which in this table is defined as all the other regions except the US and the
EU.
Table 5: Export values in full TTIP scenario, percentage changes with respect to
the baseline in 2030
Total to EU to US to RoW
EU 6.2 -3.2 111.4 -0.3
US 19.1 119.0 0.0 -0.3
NLD 4.3 -2.0 95.4 -2.8
Note: Percentage changes are for export values, while Table 4 shows changes in export volumes.
Source: Own WorldScan estimations using GTAP9 database.
28When comparing our results with those from Ecorys (2016) we obtain larger GDP effects for
the Netherlands. The reason is that Ecorys (2016) follow the estimation technique for NTB costs
from Francois et al. (2013), who in general have lower real income effects than the simulations done
in Egger et al. (2015), which we follow to estimate NTB costs. See Bekkers and Rojas-Romagosa
(2016) for a detailed comparison between the methodologies in Francois et al. (2013) and Egger
et al. (2015).
29These additional results are presented in Appendix A.2.
30Note that the total increase in US exports (19.1%) is much higher than that of the EU (6.2%)
due to the US initial export level being significantly lower than that for the EU. So despite of a
relative balanced increase in bilateral exports, the impact on total US exports is then higher.
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Table 6 presents the sectoral effects for the third scenario (full TTIP) simula-
tions. Here we find that even though overall GDP levels are increasing only by
around 1%, there are significant variations in the sectoral output. These divergent
sectoral patterns can be explained by initial tariff differentials, but more importantly,
because of sector-specific divergence in NTB cost reductions. While some sectors
experience significant expansions (e.g. processed foods and most services sectors),
other sectors will contract (metals and minerals, and other transport equipment).
These output changes are linked to export changes, where in general sectors that
are expanding are also exporting more, while contracting sectors are exporting less.
The exception is the other transport equipment, that has an output contraction but
expands its exports significantly, which means that there is a sharp reorientation of
the lower production from the domestic to the foreign market. Moreover, the sectors
that are increasing exports are also sectors that were relatively important in total
exports, such as: energy, processed foods, chemical, rubber and plastics, and other
commercial services.
In general, the shift in relative importance of different sectors generates labour
and capital displacement. Sectors that are expanding will attract more workers
and investments, while contracting sectors will reduce employment levels. In this
context, it is of particular importance that the increased labour demand is reflected
in a rise in average wages for both low- and high-skill workers. This result is not
surprising given that both the EU and the US have similar high-skilled working
populations, and both regions are preponderant in technology-intensive sectors and
relatively high-skill levels.31
Labour displacement, however, will have short term adjustment costs for those
workers that need to change employment. These adjustment costs are not accounted
for in the CGE model but are expected to be low. The required labour mobility from
TTIP is expected to be well within normal labour market movements (job creation
and destruction) in any given year. For instance, in our full TTIP simulation labour
reallocation across sectors is estimated to by 1.4% of the total employed population.
With an estimated 8.8 million employed workers in 2014 in the Netherlands32, then
an estimated 114,000 workers will need to be reallocated to another sector in a 13
year period (between 2017 to 2030). This figure, however, is relatively low compared
to the normal job reallocation in the Netherlands, where an estimated 13% of jobs
are created and destroyed in a single year (Brull et al., 2010) – i.e. around one
million jobs are reallocated yearly.33 Part of the low overall employment impact of
TTIP is that most of the production and employment changes are concentrated in
31If trade was being increased, on the contrary, with a country with relatively more lower-skill
workers than the EU –for example with China or India– then the effect on low and high-skill wages
will be expected to work differently, with high-skill EU workers benefiting with respect to low-skill
workers.
32CBS Open data StatLine website.
33It is important to note, however, that this last figure includes mainly within-sector job real-
locations, but the case remains that the number of workers that needs to reallocate to another
sector is still relatively small in comparison. On the other hand, sectoral job reallocation is also
a characteristic feature of the Dutch economy, where in particular, the share of agricultural and
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manufacturing sectors, which account for only around 15% of total employment. To
sum up, relatively few workers would have to change jobs and move from one sector
to another.
Table 6: Netherlands, sectoral percentage changes in the full TTIP scenario, with
respect to the baseline in 2030
Output Exports
Sector Code 2011 shares % change 2011 shares % change
Agriculture AGR 1.99 0.11 4.63 2.34
Oil and other mining OMI 0.20 -0.01 0.18 4.70
Energy ENG 6.50 0.85 13.37 4.92
Processed foods PFO 5.41 5.36 11.51 10.88
Low-tech manufacturing LTM 3.88 0.60 5.38 1.56
Metals and minerals MEM 3.90 -3.26 8.23 -1.88
Chemical, rubber and plastics CRP 4.49 4.68 17.72 7.32
Motor vehicles and parts MVH 1.03 1.88 3.30 3.16
Other transport equipment OTN 1.00 -6.68 1.25 22.68
Electronic equipment ELE 1.50 0.76 2.87 1.32
Other machinery and equipment OME 2.79 1.31 9.07 3.17
Construction OTP 3.27 0.44 2.00 -0.59
Other transport ATP 1.11 1.05 2.29 2.21
Air transport WTP 1.29 1.14 0.85 -0.01
Water transport CNS 9.21 2.18 0.76 1.18
Communication CMN 2.39 1.22 1.37 1.39
Finance OFI 2.76 1.11 0.41 1.03
Insurance ISR 1.46 2.20 0.46 1.18
Other commercial services OCS 20.99 1.77 11.92 9.38
Recreational and other services ROS 3.73 1.49 0.72 2.46
Government and public services OSR 21.09 1.71 1.72 0.57
Total 100.00 1.69 100.00 4.34
Notes: Export figures are in monetary values, and not in volumes like in Table 4.
Source: Own WorldScan estimations using GTAP9 database.
Finally, the trade diversion effects of TTIP will have an impact on third regions.
In Table 7 we show the percentage changes in GDP and exports for non-TTIP
regions in our full simulation scenario. We find, however, that these impacts are
relatively small. Total export decreases are less than a percentage point for all
regions, with even smaller GDP effects. The "other OECD countries" and the "Sub-
Saharan Africa" regions will be the most affected with an overall decrease in exports
of around one percentage point and a reduction in GDP of around a quarter of a
percentage point.
5 Additional economic effects from TTIP
The analyses to estimate the potential economic effects of TTIP, so far, has been
focused on what are called the "static" gains from trade. These gains are based on
manufacturing jobs has been steadily declining over the years, and the share of services jobs has
increased. This trend, moreover, is expected to continue in the future (Huizinga and Smid, 2005).
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Table 7: TTIP full scenario, percentage changes with respect to the baseline in 2030
Region Code GDP Exports
Other OECD countries ROE -0.21 -0.89
Rest of East Europe EER 0.01 -0.16
China and Hong Kong CHH 0.01 -0.15
ASEAN countries ASE -0.05 -0.26
India IND 0.01 -0.20
Middle East and North Africa MNA -0.02 -0.09
Sub-Saharan Africa SSA -0.16 -0.96
Latin America and the Caribbean LAC -0.11 -0.63
Rest of the World ROW 0.02 -0.27
Source: Own WorldScan estimations using GTAP9 database.
classical comparative advantage theory, where the reduction of trade costs (i.e. tariffs
and NTBs) is translated into increased trade for those sectors in which the country
has a comparative advantage. These comparative advantages can be explained by
relative technological levels and endowments, and by sector-specific differences in
efficiency. In this context, the reduction in trade costs from TTIP is associated with
a one-off (static) gain that stems from a better reallocation of resources to the most
efficient sectors in each economy. This is the basic mechanism behind the CGE
model analysis.
Economic theory, however, also predicts that increased trade and exposure to
international competition has positive "dynamic" effects on income.34 There are
several theoretical mechanisms where trade can increase income growth and pro-
ductivity: changes in factor accumulation of human and physical capital due to a
larger market size (Baldwin, 1992; Wacziarg, 1998), reallocation of resources to firms
with higher productivity levels (Melitz, 2003; Bernard et al., 2003), and productiv-
ity gains linked to trade-induced innovation.35 There is empirical evidence that
firm-level productivity increases due to higher returns to innovation (see Melitz and
Trefler, 2012, for an overview). In addition, increased trade flows can also be asso-
ciated with technological spillovers and learning effects that can indirectly increase
innovation and productivity.36
These theoretical dynamic gains from trade, nevertheless, are much harder to
estimate empirically. There is a large literature that has estimated the relationship
between increased trade (or changes in trade policy) and economic growth (see for
34These dynamic gains from trade refer to changes in the economy associated with the increase
in the growth of income over time.
35In particular, increased innovation and R&D investments lead to constant improvements over
time in productivity and income (Keller, 2002; Bloom et al., 2015). Moreover, there are several links
on how increased trade flows can affect innovation levels. For example, more intense competition and
higher income prospects from bigger international markets may increase the incentives to innovate,
and/or increase the importance of more innovative firms.
36An important indirect effect of innovation is that there are considerable (national and interna-
tional) spillovers from R&D investments (e.g. Coe and Helpman, 1995; Coe et al., 2009).
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example Baldwin, 2002). In general, most studies find a positive relationship, but
the magnitude of the effect and the underlying driving factors differ between stud-
ies.37 More recently, the studies by Feyrer (2009, 2011) find positive and sizeable
dynamic gains from trade. For instance, Feyrer (2011) uses the "natural experi-
ment" of the Suez canal closure in 1967 to overcome the methodological limitations
in other studies, and finds that trade has a significant impact on income. However,
these studies are highly time and event specific, and as such, do not provide reliable
estimations on the link between trade flows and productivity or income growth that
can be widely used in broad CGE applications. This is the main reason that such
"dynamic" mechanisms are usually not included in standard CGE models. Never-
theless, even if it is hard to estimate the dynamic gains from larger Transatlantic
trade, it is expected that there will be positive additional dynamic gains from TTIP.
The TTIP negotiations also include public procurement and investment pro-
visions. Correspondingly, TTIP is also expected to increase FDI bilateral flows
between both regions. For instance, Francois et al. (2012) also estimate the income
gains for MNEs if NTBs associated with investment are lowered as a result of TTIP.
Since the US and the EU are the largest recipients of FDI flows between both re-
gions, they find that the simple size of the US market implies large potential gains
even if relatively small barriers are removed. Thus, improvements in market access
associated with TTIP are likely to imply substantial changes in FDI levels.
Therefore, the potential effects estimated in Section 4.3 are likely to underes-
timate the full economic effects of TTIP, since our methodology does not analyse
additional economic effects from TTIP related to public procurement provisions,
increased FDI flows and dynamic gains from trade.
Finally, the Netherlands is a relatively small and open economy, and the impor-
tance of international trade is higher than for economies that are larger and rely less
on trade (i.e. the US). Under these circumstances, any change in trade flows and
their associated economic (static and dynamic) gains have a larger impact than for
other countries. This is reflected on the higher potential gains that the Netherlands
will have from TTIP with respect to other EU countries.
6 Conclusions
TTIP is an ambitious and comprehensive preferential trade agreement that is ex-
pected to have a significant effect in EU and US trade and investment relations.
Following several studies and our own CGE simulations, it is predicted that bilat-
eral trade between both regions will roughly double. For the Netherlands, this is
translated into a positive but moderate effect on income of 1.7% by the year 2030.
These potential gains are higher than those for the EU and the US (both around
37There are also serious data and methodological issues involved. In particular, there are econo-
metric problems with identification (due to the lack of exogenous variation in trade or trade policies)
and omitted variables bias. One of the most contentious issues is the identification of trade policy
changes, since in many countries broader economic reforms where introduced simultaneously with
trade openness measures (Rodríguez and Rodrik, 2001).
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1%). Moreover, there are potential average real wage gains of more than 2%, while
the associated labour movement between contracting and expanding sectors is ex-
pected to be within yearly labour market mobility flows. Increased transatlantic
trade will also generate trade diversion effects, where bilateral trade between the
US and the EU increases, while intra-EU trade and trade with third countries de-
creases. However, the overall export and income effects on these third countries will
be relatively small, with export decreases well below one percentage point and with
potential GDP reductions close to zero.
These expected results, nevertheless, are conditional on the final negotiated
agreement. Most CGE studies use as benchmark an "ambitious" deal that will sig-
nificantly reduce current NTB levels, which are the most important remaining trade
costs in transatlantic integration. Given the lack of concrete intermediate negotiated
outcomes, this is the best approach that can be taken for now. On the other hand,
the potential economic effects are only a tentative estimation of the impact of TTIP,
and a more detailed economic analysis should be done once the final outcome of the
negotiations is known.
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A Appendix
A.1 Technical specifications of the WorldScan CGE model
A computational general equilibrium (CGE) model consists of three main elements.
The underlying general equilibrium economic model, the multi-regional input-output
data and a set of exogenous parameters (being the most import the elasticities).
The combination of these three elements yields a general equilibrium (calibrated)
baseline in which all the accounting and market clearing conditions are met. Policy
experiments consist of a shock to one or several exogenous variable (e.g. tariffs) that
generate changes in the price and quantities of the endogenous variables such that
a new general equilibrium is reached: the counterfactual scenario. The behavioural
equations in the economic model determine how the endogenous variables react,
while the underlying baseline data and the exogenous parameters (i.e. the various
elasticities in the model) determine the size and scope of the adjustments.
Economic model
General equilibrium models describe supply and demand relations in markets. In
these models, prices and quantities of goods and factor inputs (i.e. labour and capi-
tal) adjust, such that demand and supply become equal at an equilibrium price and
quantity level. These models also describe the interactions between several markets.
For instance, firms must determine the factor inputs necessary to produce a final
good, given the price and demand of that good. Firms’ supply decisions, therefore,
depend on the equilibrium product price and in turn they determine the demand
for the necessary intermediate and factor inputs required. Consumers preferences
and budget constrains will determine the demand for final goods and the supply of
factor inputs (mainly labor). The interaction of the optimisation decisions by firms
and consumers will ultimately determine the equilibrium prices and quantities of
goods and factor inputs.
Therefore, the core elements of all CGE models are the micro-economic founded
neo-classical conditions: consumer and producer optimisation under budgetary con-
straints. Hence, economic behaviour drives the adjustment of quantities and prices
given that consumers maximise utility given the price of goods and the consumers’
budget constraints, while producers minimise costs, given input prices, the level of
output and production technology.
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These optimisation conditions are linked with market clearing conditions in the
products markets (i.e. equating demand and supply for each production sector).
The number of product markets is defined by the number of economic sectors in
the database. For instance, the GTAP database identifies 57 sectors. In addition
there are also market clearing conditions for the factor markets. Following the
example above, the supply of low- and high-skill labour by households must equal
the demand of these factor inputs by firms. There are five different factor types
in GTAP: unskilled and skilled labour, capital, land and natural resources.38 For
instance, the demand of labour (determined from the profit maximisation conditions
of firms) must equal the labour supply by households (which in turn is a function
of economically active population and labour participation rates.)
Consumption is modelled as non-homothetic demand system using the linear
expenditure system (LES). All partial elasticities of substitution for composite com-
modities as well as price and income elasticities drive demand responses to economic
shocks. Production is modelled as a nested structure of constant elasticities of sub-
stitution (CES) functions. The values of the substitution parameters reflect the
substitution possibilities between intermediate inputs and production factors.
We employ the WorldScan version with monopolistic competition and increas-
ing returns to scale (de Bruijn, 2006). This version of the model is based on a
Dixit-Stiglitz-Armington demand specification. In particular, it uses the love-of-
variety –i.e. Dixit-Stiglitz (DS)– preferences for intermediate and final goods for
non-agricultural sectors. Within a representative firm, individual varieties are sym-
metrical in terms of selling at the same price and quantity, but that increases in
the number of varieties yield economic benefits because they are perceived to be
different by intermediate and final demand agents. This DS approach is then nested
within a basic CES demand system that includes both Armington- and DS-type
demand systems for individual sectors using Ethier and Krugman-type monopolis-
tic competition models –i.e. differentiated intermediate and differentiated consumer
goods.39
This DS-Armington structure is combined with a monopolistic competition set-
ting with economies of scale. While firms behave as monopolists, the existence of
free entry drives economic profits to zero, so that pricing is at average cost, as is the
case in the perfect competition specification. Economies of scale are then modelled
using the concept of variety-scaled goods. We can define ’variety-scaled output’,
which refers to physical quantities, with a ’scaling’ or quality coefficient that reflects
the varieties embodied on total physical output. This variety-scaled output can be
substituted directly into an Armington-type demand system. The precise modelling
in the CGE-GTAP code is done by means of a closure swap that yields output level
and variety scaling effects at the sectoral level. This implies that sectoral productiv-
38The most recent GTAP-9 version identifies five different labour types, but these can be aggre-
gated to the common two labour types used in most CGE models.
39This can be done because one can reduce Ethier-Krugman-models algebraically to Armington-
type demand systems with external scale economies linked to a variety of effects (Francois and
Roland-Holst, 1997; Francois and Nelson, 2002).
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ity is now endogenous in the model and it adjusts to capture the output scale and
variety effects.
We also use the endogenous labour market version of WorldScan (Boeters and
van Leeuwen, 2010), where labour supply and unemployment are endogenously de-
termined. Labour supply, moreover, is divided between the intensive margin (hours
of work) and the extensive margin (participation). The intensive margin is deter-
mined by optimising the consumption-leisure choice of a representative household.
The extensive margin is modelled as the equilibrium between the expected utility
of participation and a fixed cost of taking up work, which varies between house-
holds. Involuntary unemployment is also endogenously modelled using a collective
bargaining mechanism.
Finally, the model provides an explicit and detailed treatment of international
trade, international transport margins and other trade costs (e.g. tariffs, NTBs,
export subsidies). Bilateral trade is handled via CES (constant elasticity of substi-
tution) preferences for intermediate and final goods, using the so-called Armington
assumption, where the substitution of domestics and imports –as well as product
differentiation– is driven by the region of origin (i.e. by import source). This as-
sumption is generic to most CGE models as it is a simple device to account for
"cross-hauling" of trade (i.e. the empirical observation that countries often simulta-
neously import and export goods in the same product category).
A summary of the general equilibrium equations of WorldScan is provided in
Appendix A in Lejour et al. (2006)
Underlying data and calibration
The primary data input is a global multi-regional input-output (GMRIO) database.
In particular, we use the GTAP database, which provides balanced and harmonised
input-output matrices, bilateral trade and protection data. For this particular
WorldScan simulation we use GTAP-9 database with base-year 2011 (cf. Narayanan
et al., 2015). The specific sectoral and regional aggregation is presented in Tables 8
and 9, respectively.
The economic model is then calibrated to the GTAP base year of 2011 using a
set of exogenous parameters (mainly consumption and production elasticities). Our
baseline scenario runs from 2011 to 2030. To construct this scenario we combine the
GTAP9 data with the following additional data:
∙ GDP growth per capita projections taken from the OECD.
∙ Total labour supply (𝐿𝑆𝑢𝑝) is built using a combination of demographic and
labour data projections, as:
𝐿𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑡 = 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡 * 𝑃𝑅𝑡 * (1− 𝜇𝑡) (1)
where 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑡 is total population in year 𝑡 with projections taken from the
Medium Variant of projections by the United Nations (UN, 2015) (for non-
EU countries) and EuroStat population projections for EU countries. Labour
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Table 8: Sectoral GTAP aggregation used in WorldScan simulations
number code WorldScan sector Aggregated GTAP Sectors GTAP codes
1 AGR Agriculture Paddy rice, Wheat, Other cereal grains, Vegetables & fruits, PDR, WHT, GRO, V_F,
Oil seeds, Sugar cane, Plant-based fibers, Other crops, OSD, C_B, PFB, OCR,
Bovine cattle, Other animal products, Raw milk, Wool, CTL, OAP, RMK, WOL,
Forestry, Fishing FRS, FSH
2 OMI Oil and other mining Oil, Other minerals OIL, OMN
3 ENG Energy Coal, Natural gas, Petroleum & coal products COA, GAS, P_C
Electricity, Gas manufacture & distribution ELY, GDT
4 PFO Processed foods Bovine meat products, Other meat products, Vegetable oils CMT, OMT, VOL,
Dairy products, Processed rice, Sugar, Other food products MIL, PCR, SGR, OFD,
Beverages & tobacco B_T
5 LTM Low-tech manufacturing Textiles, Wearing apparel, Leather products, Wood products TEX, WAP, LEA, LUM,
Paper products & publishing, Other manufactures PPP, OMF
6 MEM Metals and minerals Other mineral products, Ferrous metals, Other metals NMM, I_S, NFM,
Metal products FMP
7 CRP Chemical, rubber and plastics Chemical, rubber & plastic products CRP
8 MVH Motor vehicles and parts Motor vehicles & parts MVH
9 OTN Other transport equipment Other transport equipment OTN
10 ELE Electronic equipment Electronic equipment ELE
11 OME Other machinery and equipment Other machinery & equipment OME
12 CNS Construction Construction CNS
13 WTP Water transport Water transport WTP
14 ATP Air transport Air transport ATP
15 OTP Other transport Other Transport OTP
16 CMN Communication Communication CMN
17 OFI Finance Other financial services OFI
18 ISR Insurance Insurance ISR
19 OCS Other commercial services Trade, Other business services TRD, OBS
20 ROS Recreational and other services Recreational & other services ROS
21 OSR Government and public services Water, Public administration & public services, Dwellings WTR, OSG, DWE
participation rates (PR) are taken from ILO projections.40 Long-term unem-
ployment rates (𝜇) are taken from from EuroStat and World Bank projections.
∙ Trade balances are projected to gradually decrease over time. As an initial
benchmark we use the updated 2011 net foreign assets data from Lane and
Milesi-Ferreti (2001).
The initial (calibrated) condition of the model is that supply and demand are
in balance at some equilibrium set of prices and quantities; where workers are sat-
isfied with their wages and employment, consumers are satisfied with their basket
of goods, producers are satisfied with their input and output quantities and savings
are fully expended on investments. Adjustment to a new equilibrium, governed by
behavioural equations and parameters in the model, are largely driven by price link-
age equations that determine economic activity in each product and factor market.
For any perturbation to the initial equilibrium, all endogenous variables (i.e. prices
and quantities) adjust simultaneously until the economy reaches a new equilibrium.
Constraints on the adjustment to a new equilibrium include a suit of accounting re-
lationships that dictate that in aggregate, the supply of goods equals the demand for
goods, total exports equals total imports, all (available) workers and capital stock is
employed, and global savings equals global investment; unless adjustments to these
assumptions are modified for a particular application.
40From the Economically Active Population Estimates and Projections (EAPEP).
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Table 9: Regional GTAP aggregation used in WorldScan simulations
Number Code Country/Region description
1 AUT Austria
2 BAL Baltic countries
3 BGR Bulgaria
4 BLU Belgium and Luxembourg
5 CCM Croatia, Cyprus and Malta
6 CZE Czech Republic
7 DNK Denmark
8 FIN Finland
9 FRA France
10 DEU Germany
11 GRC Greece
12 HUN Hungary
13 IRL Ireland
14 ITA Italy
15 NLD Netherlands
16 POL Poland
17 PRT Portugal
18 ROU Romania
19 SVK Slovakia
20 SVN Slovenia
21 ESP Spain
22 SWE Sweden
23 GBR United Kingdom
24 USA United States
25 ROE Rest of OECD
26 EER Rest of East Europe
27 CHH China and Hong Kong
28 ASE ASEAN
29 IND India
30 MNA Middle East and North Africa
31 SSA Sub-Saharan Africa
32 LAC Latin America and the Caribbean
33 ROW Rest of the World
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A.2 TTIP simulations with different NTB reductions
Table 10 presents the main macroeconomic results of TTIP with different NTB
reductions than those presented in the main scenario (Table 4). We observe that
there is a quasi-linear relation between NTB cuts and GDP gains: i.e. reducing the
NTB reductions by half, also reduced the GDP gains by roughly half.
Table 10: TTIP simulation results using different NTB reductions, percentage
changes with respect to the baseline in 2030
Full TTIP 50% NTB reduction 25% NTB reduction
NLD EU28 USA NLD EU28 USA NLD EU28 USA
GDP 1.69 1.19 0.94 0.81 0.59 0.55 0.39 0.30 0.33
consumption per capita 3.11 2.16 1.93 1.33 0.89 0.86 0.61 0.41 0.44
export volume 3.94 6.24 21.45 1.80 2.81 9.95 0.94 1.47 5.33
import volume 7.50 8.99 23.85 3.11 3.70 10.16 1.51 1.82 5.12
real average wage 2.13 1.66 1.59 0.91 0.68 0.73 0.42 0.32 0.39
Notes: The 50 and 25% NTB reduction are relative to the NTB reductions in the full TTIP
scenario.
Source: Own WorldScan estimations using GTAP9 database.
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